

Is There a 'European Approach' to Security?

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With the end of the Cold War, expectations of a new era of peace were unfortunately disappointed. Even in Europe, civil wars in former Yugoslavia and terrorist attacks cost thousands of victims. In 2001, in the wake of the September 11th attacks, the United States responded with a “war on terrorism.” Without underestimating the threat posed by terrorists, European countries have tended to take a different response. Some observers regard recent disagreements between the United States and the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance as unprecedented and unusually serious. But in some respects, the current situation is reminiscent of European and American disagreements of two decades ago, when a particular “European approach” to security came to challenge official US views.

This is the second time I have attended an ISODARCO course. The first time was just over twenty years ago, July 1984 in Venice. At that time relations between what we used to call the superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union – were at a low point. Both countries were developing and deploying new generations of nuclear weapons and had concentrated in the center of Europe forces of conventional military power unprecedented in history. At the time there emerged in Europe a popular movement that was critical of both superpowers for their military policies and a group of scholars affiliated with universities and peace research institutes who proposed alternatives. In

retrospect we can see that there was something like a European way of approaching the problems of security in the 1980s, one that I argue made a major contribution to ending the superpower arms race and the Cold War. The question I want to pose here is whether there is a European way, a particular European perspective, on today's pressing security problems – terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. My argument is that one can in fact identify a particular European approach to dealing with security issues, and it is most evident when contrasted to the approach pursued by the United States and by Russia.

A European Approach to Ending the Cold War

Before turning to that topic, I would like to review what I consider a useful historical precedent – the European ideas that helped end the Cold War. A number of proposals emerged in the 1980s intended to improve the security situation in Europe and to bring the arms race to an end. For example, such experts as Anders Boserup of Denmark and Lutz Unterseher of Germany made proposals for restructuring conventional forces in Europe to create systems of non-offensive defense. Within a few years, these proposals were making their way into the Soviet Union, and through the efforts of Aleksei Arbatov, Andrei Kokoshin, and other civilian experts they came to be adopted as part of the “new

thinking” in security policy promoted by Mikhail Gorbachev.¹ Institutions such as ISODARCO played an important role in this process, as they brought together innovative thinkers from East and West to share ideas, many of which made their way into policy.²

Another important idea was the role that unilateral initiatives of restraint could play in bringing an end to the arms race. This was a time when the United States was deploying new nuclear missiles to Europe and a huge popular movement rose up in opposition. Many of the leaders of the European Nuclear Disarmament (END) movement, such as Mary Kaldor and E.P. Thompson, argued that the Europeans should renounce nuclear weapons unilaterally, both to improve their own security and to reduce the threat to the Soviet Union in hopes that it would in turn reduce its military forces. In fact, it turned out the other way around. The NATO countries were unwilling to make any unilateral reductions, but under Gorbachev, the Soviet side undertook a number of initiatives of unilateral restraint, such as suspending nuclear testing, freezing the deployment of SS-20 missiles targeted against Europe, and carrying out major reductions in its conventional forces. The theory of unilateral restraint worked in practice and contributed to the end of the Cold War.

¹ This discussion of the 1980s draws on the evidence presented in Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).

² For some of the contributions at the 1984 ISODARCO meeting, see David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf, eds., *The Arms Race in the Era of Star Wars* (London: Macmillan, 1988).

Of course that is not the way many of the more hawkish elements in the United States tell the story of how the Cold War ended. For them it was entirely a matter of US military power and the policies of “peace through strength” that forced the Soviet Union to settle the Cold War on US terms. From this perspective, what role did the Europeans play? For many US officials, the NATO allies, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, were constantly threatening to undermine the firm position of the United States, and were always suspected of favoring policies of neutralism and appeasement. Initiatives such as German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s *Ostpolitik* or the Helsinki Accords were criticized by some circles in the United States on precisely these grounds. And as for the popular movements against the arms race and the Cold War, President Ronald Reagan expressed a common view on the Right when he said that the mass demonstrations of the early 1980s were “bought and paid for by the Soviet Union.”³ It would surely be an exaggeration to say that the level of animosity between the United States and its European allies that we have observed in connection with the war on Iraq is something wholly unprecedented in NATO’s history.

Security Threats of the 21st Century

Now the Cold War is past, Europe is united, and the United States and Russia no longer consider each other enemies and no longer compete for influence in the

³ The fuller quotation is that the demonstrations were “all sponsored by the World Peace Council, which is bought and paid for by the Soviet Union.” Quoted in Strobe Talbott, *Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control* (New York: Vintage Books, 1985).

Third World. Nevertheless, we still find ourselves facing a dangerous world. The arsenals of Russia and the United States still contain thousands of nuclear weapons, and more states, such as India and Pakistan, have joined the nuclear club since the end of the Cold War. Between the deliberate, illegal sales of nuclear materials and their theft from insecure sites, the danger of nuclear proliferation seems to have increased. Finally, the threat of terrorists gaining access to weapons of mass destruction has come to replace our Cold War nightmare of nuclear holocaust with that of a nuclear 9-11, a nuclear Madrid, or a nuclear Dubrovka or Beslan.

Ironically, in retrospect we could argue that many of today's threats stem from the successes that the peace movement and the peace-research community achieved during the Cold War. The dismantling of the Iron Curtain, the withdrawal of Soviet military power from Eastern Europe, and ultimately the disintegration of the Soviet Union led to a vast reduction in the Soviet armed forces and the demobilization of thousands of soldiers and officers. With the end of the system of central planning and the opening up of the Russian economy to foreign competition and "shock therapy," many of these former soldiers faced dire economic prospects. With few skills, aside from the deployment of violence, many joined privatized security forces and organized criminal gangs, contributing to instability and terrorism on Russia's vast territory. At one point Russian military units trained Chechen fighters to help the rebels in Abkhazia seeking to secede from Georgia; a couple of years later those same

Chechens and others were killing Russian soldiers in a bid for Chechnya's own secession from the Russian Federation.

This is a phenomenon that the US Central Intelligence Agency has called "blowback," and it has had disastrous consequences for the United States as well. The example that everyone knows is US support for the forces in Afghanistan opposing the Soviet intervention there in 1979, the mujahadeen who evolved into Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda organization and carried out the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. What is perhaps less known is that US support for the Islamist radicals in Afghanistan began almost a half year before the Soviet invasion of late December 1979. In an interview with the Paris weekly *Nouvel Observateur* in 1998, Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor to President Jimmy Carter, revealed that the president signed a directive authorizing the CIA to provide funds to the mujahadeen in early July 1979. Perhaps more surprising is that Brzezinski expressed no regrets, believing as he does, that the US aid contributed to the end of the Cold War and the fall of communism in Eastern Europe.

Here is an excerpt from the exchange, starting with the journalist's question:

Question: ...[D]o you regret having supported Islamic fundamentalism, having given arms and advice to future terrorists?

Brzezinski: What is most important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war?

Question: Some stirred-up Moslems? But it has been said and repeated Islamic fundamentalism represents a world menace today.

Brzezinski: Nonsense! It is said that the West had a global policy in regard to Islam. That is stupid. There isn't a global Islam. Look at Islam in a rational manner and without demagoguery or emotion. It is the leading religion of the world with 1.5 billion followers. But what is there in common among Saudi Arabian fundamentalism, moderate Morocco, Pakistan militarism, Egyptian pro-Western or Central Asian secularism? Nothing more than what unites the Christian countries.⁴

Even after September 11th, one could argue that Brzezinski had a valid point, that it does not make sense to think of a united Islam aligned against the West. Clearly Brzezinski rejects the notion of a “clash of civilizations,” promoted by Samuel Huntington. But there are Muslims, still a minority, we hope, who consider that they are engaged in a global *jihad* against the West, and many have taken up arms and carried out terrorist acts. And where do they come from? They come from every country and region Brzezinski mentioned as reflecting the diversity of Islam, and others besides. What is it that has united all of these disparate fighters in a common cause? Clearly a main source of inspiration has been the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, acts justified as part of the global war on terrorism, but which in fact have served as a major recruiting tool for future terrorists. Critics of the war, including many European governments, anticipated this outcome and opposed the invasion on these and other grounds.

⁴ *Le Nouvel Observateur*, Paris, 15-21 January 1998.

When we turn to Russia we see another case of a country opposing terrorism with a blunt military instrument that only makes the situation worse. I am speaking, of course, of the conflict in Chechnya. The Russian government characterizes its military presence there as an anti-terrorist operation, but we should not forget that the war, when it began ten years ago, was originally intended to crush a separatist movement and that terrorist methods have been employed by all sides in the conflict.⁵ As a result of the ongoing conflict we have seen terrorism spread beyond Chechnya, with bombings in Moscow, the downing of civilian airliners, and the barbarous seizure of the Beslan schoolhouse; from the Russian side we have seen sweep operations conducted against Chechen refugee camps in Ingushetiia, with kidnappings, beatings, and executions.

There are obvious differences between the Russian war in Chechnya and the US war in Iraq. Russia has the legal right to use military force to suppress a rebellion on its territory, whereas the US invasion of a foreign country that posed no direct military threat was clearly illegal. My point, however, is not to assess the legality of the two actions, much less to offer any justification for the brutal acts of terror carried out by some Chechens and Iraqis. My argument is a simple one: both of these wars, justified as a means of combating terrorism, have probably served to exacerbate rather than eliminate the terrorist menace.

⁵ For background on the war, see Matthew Evangelista, *The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union?* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002).

Do the Europeans have a better way? In the late 1980s, nationalists in the Baltic republics of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia were agitating for independence by arguing that their countries naturally belonged to Europe and should not be part of the Soviet Union. When one Lithuanian nationalist was asked for his definition of Europe, however, the best he could manage was that “Europe is...not Russia.”⁶ That is the inspiration for my answer to the question of what is the European approach to dealing with terrorism: Well, I’m not sure, but I know it is not the Russian one...and not the American one either. The US and Russian governments have sought to deal with terrorism by declaring war on it, and waging actual wars, in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Chechnya. They have limited the rights of their citizens in the name of security, as many countries do in wartime. These policies have not shown much success.

It has become commonplace to say that Europe approaches terrorism differently, through the prism of law enforcement, rather than war. Robert Kagan has made the famous distinction between Europe and the United States by claiming that Europeans are from Venus and Americans from Mars.⁷ This answer, plausible

⁶ Quoted in Rawi Abdelal, *National Purpose in the World Economy: Post-Soviet States in Comparative Perspective* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001).

⁷ Unfortunately, in the Italian translation of Kagan’s book, *Paradise and Power*, the reference to Mars and Venus is changed to “two different planets”: “[A]mericani ed europei paiano apparenere a due pianteti diversi...” Robert Kagan, *Paradiso e potere* (Milano: Mondadori, 2003), pp. 3-4, quoted in Anthony Marasco, “Neoconservatori, l’illusione di un futuro nel passato,” *Biblioteca della libertà*, no. 169 (May-June 2003), pp. 27-45, at p. 29, note 7.

as far as it goes, only gives rise to further questions. Does Europe's preference for reliance on law, international institutions, and peaceful resolution of conflict stem from its relative military weakness, as Kagan suggests? If the European Union disposed of military power comparable to that of the United States would it be more inclined to use force to deal with security threats, such as terrorism?

Given Europeans' reluctance to consider terrorism primarily a military problem (the "war on terrorism"), we should consider the effectiveness of alternative methods involving law enforcement. In Europe, enforcing the law against suspected terrorists inevitably opens a discussion of immigrants and immigration policy. European countries that were major colonial powers in places like North Africa and South Asia for over a century are now home to millions of immigrants from those regions, many of them from Islamic backgrounds. Europe's success in fighting terrorism will depend very much on how it deals with its immigrants. Here, I would suggest, Europeans might have something to learn from the United States and from Russia.

This might be the right place to point out that I am not, of course, making generalizations about all Europeans, or all Russians, or all Americans, but rather the overall approach of their governments. In fact, some excellent critiques of the "war paradigm" as applied to terrorism have come from Americans, along with sensible suggestions for applying law enforcement techniques. At the same time, some of the most effective criticisms of Putin's approach to Chechen

terrorism have come from Russians.⁸ And finally, there are plenty of Europeans who have backed the war in Iraq and who have taken an approach to terrorism similar to what I associate with the US government. But, by and large, European governments have taken a different approach.

European approaches to terrorism

The first thing to say about European approaches to terrorism is that they are the product of considerable experience. Consider these statistics: In the first six months of one year, there were 1400 episodes of political violence, including 925 bombings and shootings. Some 22 terrorist “groups organized on a permanent basis” were responsible for half of the incidents, but there were more than a hundred groups whose names were known to the authorities during that same period. About a thousand militants had gone underground and were involved in what were called “urban guerrilla activities.” An estimated 3000-8000 “part-time guerrillas” lived ordinary legal lives, but participated in some way in the terrorist acts. Sympathizers to those engaged in political violence were estimated to number between two and three hundred thousand. Is this a depiction of Iraq in 2003? No, the country was Italy and the year was 1978.⁹

⁸ For examples, see Philip B. Heymann, *Terrorism, Freedom, and Security: Winning without War* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003); David Cole, *Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism* (New York: New Press, 2003); Anna Politkovskaia, *A Small Corner of Hell: Dispatches from Chechnya* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2003); Valery Tishkov, *Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004).

⁹ The figures come from Alessandro Silj’s contribution to David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf, eds., *Contemporary Terror* (London: Macmillan, 1981).

One should not, of course, assume that the political violence that afflicted several European countries in the 1970s is the same as the transnational Islamist terrorism of the al Qaeda sort. The differences between the two constitute an important research question in itself. But I think we understand enough about how European states dealt with the reality of terrorism in the 1970s to identify a European approach, and one that seems to have worked.

Among the generalizations that one encounters in the literature are the following:¹⁰ Many terrorists seem to have emerged from student and labor movements when pathways for peaceful participation and ways to address their demands were blocked. Activists who turned to violence had often been victims of state violence and repression themselves. As one observer mentioned in regard to the French war in Algeria and the troubles in Northern Ireland -- prisons turn out to be "a marvelous recruiting and training centre."¹¹ How did the urban terrorism of 1970s Europe end? Here the generalization that seems most convincing is that political systems and social and political organizations became more inclusive and more open to the concerns that had earlier found expression only in political violence. By addressing the main grievances that underlay the violence, the authorities could isolate the relatively small number of terrorists

¹⁰ Donatella Della Porta and Sidney Tarrow, "Unwanted Children: Political Violence and the Cycle of Protest in Italy, 1966-1973," *European Journal of Political Research* 14 (1986); Sidney Tarrow, *Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy 1965-1975* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). For a good summary and application of this literature to current concerns, see Anne Marie Baylouny, "Democratic Inclusion: A Solution to Militancy in Islamist Movements?" *Strategic Insights*, Vol. 3, Issue 4 (April 2004), <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/apr/baylounyApr04.asp>

¹¹ Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace* (New York: Viking, 1978), p. 111.

from the much larger population of potential sympathizers. The point is not that every terrorist is motivated by a legitimate political grievance that should be addressed. The point is rather that for terrorism to persist on any meaningful scale it has to have some at least passive support from a broader group of individuals who themselves might not consider engaging in violence. If those individuals find their concerns addressed by the government and society, they are more likely to withhold their support from the terrorists who remain committed to violence and even endorse state efforts to maintain order.

So how does this “European approach” differ from the way the United States and Russia have dealt with terrorism? In confronting terrorism Europeans are more likely to consider underlying motives and grievances rather than simply divide the world into good and evil. In the United States, in the immediate aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks, it was very difficult for people to talk about the political motives or possible grievances of the al Qaeda terrorists without being accused of justifying or apologizing for terrorism. In Russia, it can’t be easy for people to call attention to the ongoing depredations against the civilian population in Chechnya when Chechen terrorists are blowing up airplanes and murdering school children. In Europe, there seems more of a willingness to understand the motives of terrorists and to recognize the genuine grievances that might make ordinarily peaceful people sympathetic to the cause if not the methods of terrorists.

But surely this can be taken too far. Consider the argument made by the journalist Tiziano Terzani in a book that was at the top of the bestseller lists in

this Italy in the months following the September 11th attacks. He equated Osama bin Laden with Warren Anderson, the head of the Union Carbide company whose chemical plant at Bhopal in India exploded in 1984, killing some 16,000 people. Anderson's company was clearly guilty of criminal negligence, but Terzani goes further: "Was he too a terrorist?" he asks. "From the point of view of these deaths, probably yes."¹² This kind of moral relativism does not, in my view, make a positive contribution to reducing terrorism. Moreover, although there is wide disagreement about the proper definition of terrorism, most hold that those carrying out the violence – whether they are non-state actors or connected to state agencies -- have political motives. Putting even thousands of people's lives at risk for the sake of corporate profit should not be considered in the same category, even though it is certainly worthy of our condemnation.

Terrorism and immigration policy

Let us turn now to considering the links between counterterrorism and policy toward immigrants. Here I want to take a position opposite to what I have been arguing in these other security domains and suggest that the traditional approach by both the United States and Russia to its Muslim immigrant populations has been more effective than the European approach in containing and addressing

¹² Tiziano Terzani, *Lettere contro la Guerra* (Milan: Longanesi & C., 2002), p. 52. Terzani cites Arundhati Roy, who mentions Warren Anderson's crime in her article, "The algebra of infinite justice," *The Guardian*, 27 September 2001, and suggests that he should be extradited and put on trial, as the US Government demanded the Taliban to turn over Bin Laden; she does not equate the two as explicitly as Terzani does.

the grievances that could spawn terrorism.¹³ Unfortunately, I have to emphasize that I am referring to the *traditional* approaches, in other words the ones of the past. In my view, both the United States and Russia have recently departed from those approaches in ways that are likely to exacerbate rather than limit the risks of terrorism. So we might say that I am referring now to the “ideal types” of US and Russian policy, whereas the actual policies have been moving away from the ideal.

A good expression of the ideal-type US policy came in a recent article by the economist Robert Kuttner:

Unlike America, with its religious diversity and assimilation of immigrants, Europe’s Muslim communities tend to dwell in separate, hermetic worlds, whether in France, Germany, or Spain. Spanish police had little purchase on the terrorist cells, whose members moved easily in the Moroccan barrios of Madrid. By contrast, not one of the September 11 terrorists was a permanent immigrant to America; all had to be imported for the deed. America’s tradition of pluralism and its assimilationist tolerance based on a

¹³ For interesting discussion of the status of Muslim immigrants in Italy, see Stefano Allievi, *Islam italiano: Viaggio nella seconda religione del paese* (Torino: Einaudi, 2003); and Yahya Sergio Yahe Pallavicini, *L'Islam in Europa: Riflessioni di un imam italiano* (Milano: Il Saggiatore, 2004). A cross-national project currently underway and directed by Alessandro Silj, should provide valuable comparative analysis of European immigration policy.

secular constitution are a little-appreciated source of our security as a nation.¹⁴

Recently, these positive features of US immigration policy have come under assault from two directions. First, in the immediate aftermath of the 11 September attacks, a panicked US government rounded up and arrested some 5000 immigrants, held them in detention without access to lawyers and unable even to notify their families, and then summarily deported many of them, without any right of appeal.¹⁵ The second assault is on the US secular constitution itself, from those who would like to make a certain form of fundamentalist Christianity the state religion. They are not satisfied that the president himself claims to take his instructions directly from God. They appear to want to do away with the separation of church and state altogether.

What about Russia's policy towards Muslim immigrants? Why do I think that there is a lesson here for Europeans? First, I should point out that we are not actually speaking here of "immigrants." Even though the Russian Federation is home to perhaps 20 million people of Muslim background – about the same number as Western Europe as a whole – most of them did not immigrate. In many cases their ancestors have lived on the same territory since before there was anything like a Russian state. In that respect, Islam is one of Russia's traditional religions, along with Orthodox Christianity and Judaism. In the Soviet

¹⁴ Robert Kutner, "What Would Jefferson Do?" *The American Prospect* (November 2004), p. 38.

¹⁵ Cole, *Enemy Aliens*.

era, it suffered the same fate as the other religions, with an official policy that alternated between tolerance, attempts at cooptation, and repression.¹⁶

The main impact of the Soviet experience was economic development and modernization that brought in its train, urbanization, education, secularization, and a high level of assimilation of Muslim groups, particularly those outside the isolated, traditional villages of the North Caucasus. Soviet nationalities policy fostered teaching and codification of native languages and development of local culture.¹⁷ Paradoxically, these Soviet policies helped contribute to the reemergence of nationalist and religious sentiment and a focus on “identity politics,” as the old political and economic order broke down.¹⁸

The post-Soviet success stories are the regions where governments are able to manage their economic and social policies to keep Islamic culture and religion from becoming politicized. Sometimes that may mean taking approaches that violate conventional understandings of secular government. Murtaza Rakhimov, the president of the Russian republic of Bashkortostan, for example, sought to win over local Muslim believers by signing a decree providing state funding for the restoration of a major mosque, while placating the Russian population by

¹⁶ Aleksei Malashenko, *Islamskoe vozrozhdenie v sovremennoi Rossii* [Islamic revival in contemporary Russia] (Moscow: Carnegie Center, 1998).

¹⁷ Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001).

¹⁸ Martha Brill Olcott and Aleksei Malashenko, *Faktor etnokonfessional'noi samobytnosti v postsovetskom obshchestve* [Factors of ethno-political identification in post-Soviet society] (Moscow: Carnegie Center, 1998).

restoring the Orthodox cathedral.¹⁹ In Ingushetiia, during the presidency of Ruslan Aushev, the practice of polygamy was accepted as a way of providing protection for women in a dangerous and unstable region bordering Chechnya. Aushev also legalized a limited form of the traditional vendetta to deter kidnappings by authorizing the revenge killing of those responsible for them.²⁰ I don't recommend these precise policies for Western Europe, but I do think that Russia's long history of relations with its Muslim peoples has contributed to a certain flexibility in dealing with and anticipating possible problems that could give rise to violence if left unaddressed.

Unfortunately, as with the US case, I can't finish my discussion of the Russian model on an entirely positive note. My concern is that the spillover from the Chechen war is creating a climate of suspicion of any dark-skinned person who might be from the Caucasus region, and this includes genuine immigrants – migrant workers from Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, for example, whose economies are heavily dependent on the wages that these workers send home. There have been many worrying instances of skin-head violence and also official policies of discrimination. Just as the first Chechen war was ending, some bombs went off in Moscow. In response, Mayor Iurii Luzhkov blamed Chechens

¹⁹ Filial' Shaiakhmetov, "Demokratizatsiia Bashkirskogo obshchestva i Islam" [Democratization of Bashkir society and Islam], in A.B. Iunovskii and A.V. Malashenko, *Etnichnost' i konfessional'naia traditsiia v volgo-ural'skom regione Rossii* [Ethnicity and confessional tradition in the Volga-Urals region of Russia] (Moscow: Carnegie Center, 1998), p. 30.

²⁰ Georgi M. Derluguian, "A Soviet general and nation building," *Chicago Tribune*, 28 October 2001.

and ordered his police officials to take “retaliatory actions” against the city’s Chechen diaspora.²¹ In September 1999, after a series of apartment bombings that coincided with the resumption of war in Chechnya, Luzhkov had thousands of people rounded up on the basis of their physical appearance and then expelled from the city if their residency permits were not in order. Similar incidents took place in other Russian cities, creating a climate of impunity for those who would engage in discrimination and violence.

Let me summarize my argument so far. European governments, perhaps because of their experience with terrorism in the 1970s, have sought to combat it through the use of intelligence, law enforcement, and addressing political grievances, whereas the US and Russian governments have favored military methods. Contrary to Kagan’s argument, the different preferences of Russian, American, and European governments are not a function of their military capabilities, as we see when we turn now to the question of nuclear proliferation.

The Nuclear Threat

Russians, Europeans, and Americans appear to share the perception that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear ones, threatens international security. One can readily understand the disastrous consequences of nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists. When it comes to the development

²¹ A.V. Cherkasov and O.P. Orlov, “Khronika vooruzhennogo konflikta” [Chronicle of the armed conflict], in the Memorial group’s collection, *Rossia-Chechnia: Tsep’ oshibok i prestuplenii* [Russia-Chechnya: A chain of mistakes and crimes] (Moscow: Zven’ia, 1998), pp. 80-81 .

of nuclear-weapons programs by states, there might be more room for debate. First of all, there is something peculiar about countries that have built tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, capable of annihilating all life on the planet (and kept them on dangerous hair-trigger alert) arguing that they are the only ones responsible enough to maintain nuclear arsenals. With the end of the Cold War, the leading nuclear powers – the United States, Russia, France, Britain, and China – no longer consider each other enemies, yet they have claim that nuclear deterrence is essential for their security. Would it be so unreasonable, then, to credit aspiring nuclear powers such as Iran and North Korea with some legitimate security concerns given that they have genuine enemies armed with nuclear weapons?²² Even if one agrees with the argument that the world would be safer with a nuclear-free Iran and North Korea (as I do), it does not follow that the best path to achieve that outcome is for the nuclear powers to insist that they are the law abiding states and the others are rogues or outlaws. The reluctance of the United States and the other nuclear powers to pursue nuclear disarmament puts them in contravention of their commitments under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the legal basis for criticizing such countries as Iran and North Korea. In

²² Bruce Cumings, « Chantage nucléaire en Corée du Nord, » *Le Monde Diplomatique*, February 2003, http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2003/02/CUMINGS/9950?var_recherche=coree+du+nord; and Cumings, “Korea: forgotten nuclear threats,” *Le Monde Diplomatique*, English edition, December 2004, <http://mondediplo.com/2004/12/08korea>.

other words, the double standards and hypocrisy of the nuclear powers have contributed to the threat of nuclear proliferation.

A recent report commissioned by the secretary general of the United Nations made this point when it called attention to a number of measures that the nuclear powers could take to reinforce the Nonproliferation Treaty: honor their commitments under article VI of the Treaty to move towards disarmament; reaffirm their previous commitments not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states; commit to practical measures to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war, including, where appropriate, a progressive schedule for de-alerting their strategic nuclear weapons; agree to have the Security Council explicitly pledge to take collective action in response to a nuclear attack or the threat of such attack on a non-nuclear-weapon state.²³ These are the sorts of measures that countries committed to the rule of law would favor, and we expect to see more support for such measures by European countries (with the possible exception of the European nuclear powers, France and Britain) than by the present US government.

²³ "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility," summarized in Caterina Dutto, "UN High-Level Panel Report: Reducing Demand for Nuclear Weapons," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 23 December 2004, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16304>
Panel Members include: Anand Panyarachun, Chair (Thailand), Robert Badinter (France), Joao Clemente Baena Soares (Brazil), Gareth Evans (Australia), Amre Moussa (Egypt), Sadako Ogata (Japan), Yevgeny Primakov (Russian Federation) and Brent Scowcroft (United States).

In addressing nuclear proliferation, would a militarily stronger Europe express less commitment to the rule of law and to diplomacy than it does now? The United States dealt with suspicions about Saddam Hussein's nuclear intentions by launching a war. It has made contingency plans to invade Iran and Syria, and it has threatened North Korea. It is hard to believe that a European Union, even with powerful military forces, would engage in such behavior. It seems more likely that Europe would continue to favor a mix of diplomacy, with political and economic incentives and sanctions, and a continued commitment to international institutions and agreements.

The European Security Strategy, issued in 2003, provides a good summary of what I have characterized as the European approach to security. It also addresses indirectly the hypothetical question I raised about Robert Kagan's assumptions. The introduction to the report points out that "the end of the Cold War has left the United States in the dominant position as a military actor. However, no single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own."²⁴ In other words, even if a European country or the European Union disposed of the same military power as the United States – if it held the dominant position in the world from a military standpoint – that would not solve its security problems. It would still need the diplomatic skills, economic and political

²⁴ European Security Strategy 2003, drafted by Javier Solanas and available on his website: <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>

strengths, and the commitment to international law, institutions, and multilateralism that have characterized the European approach.²⁵

Clearly there is still a distinctive European approach to security, as there was during the Cold War. One difference between that period and now, however, is that at least we were able to recognize the end of the Cold War when it happened. How will we know when the threat of terrorism or nuclear proliferation has ended? The US policy of waging war against terrorism and continuing its love affair with nuclear weapons makes it more likely that those threats will never go away. The European approach offers us more hope.

²⁵ For a thoughtful discussion of these issues, and many useful references, see the contribution of Tsveta Petrova in Matthew Evangelista and Vittorio Parsi, eds., *Partners or Rivals? European-American Relations after Iraq* (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 2005).