

Passenger Pre-screening programs: Secure Flight

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- **previous PNRs, frequent flier programmes for the passenger.**

PNR-based inference

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- **In USA, 27.3 million ID theft victims during 1998-2003, doubling every year** [FTC 03]

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- TSA violated the 1974 Privacy Act in relation to SF
[GAO 05d - Jul. 22, SFWG 05a - Sep 19, DHS/TSA 05a - Jun. 22, EFF 05a - Aug. 22, 2005]

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[DHS/TSA 06a - Feb. 9, 2006]

[GAO 06a - Feb. 9, 2006]

AVIATION SECURITY. Significant Management Challenges May Adversely Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration's Secure Flight Program
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Epilogue?

Epilogue? Or reincarnation!

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(and related controversies)

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no way I'll consent to give up my rights!