

## **Preserving the Nuances of Humanliness in Spite of Fear, Ideological Bombardment and Prevailing Egotism of Victimization**

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In psychiatry, when it was designed as a field, there was expectable average environment. Now there is a completely new situation where there are participants who do not have a return address.

Psychiatry as a profession accepts that two opposites could be equally true. I would like to focus on some aspects of diplomacy at its worst (ref: "Diplomacy at its Worst," Kristof, Nicholas D.) where he states that in May 2003, Iran sent a secret proposal to the United States to settle our mutual disputes in a "Grand Bargain".

It is an astonishing document for it tries to address a range of United States concerns about nuclear weapons, terrorism and Iraq. I placed it and related documents, including multiple drafts of it, on my blog. Several reports of the Iranian proposal have emerged previously but when one reads the full documentary record, one can see what the hardliners killed wasn't just one faxed Iranian proposal but an entire peace process. The process began with Afghanistan in 2001-2002 -- Iran and the US, both opponents of the Taliban, cooperated closely in stabilizing Afghanistan, providing aid and unofficial Track 2 processes. On the U.S. side, Track 2 involved well-connected former US ambassadors, including Thomas Pickering, Frank Wisner and Nicholas Platt. The Iranian ambassador to the UN, Javad Zarif, was a central player as was an Iranian-American professor at Rutgers, Hooshang Amirahmadi, who headed a friendship group called the Iranian-American Council.

From an article in the Armed Forces Journal, July, 2006, titled "Clausewitz and World War IV," by Major General Robert Scales (retired), Scales reports that... Periodically changes in the culture, technology, economic or demographic, induce movements to revise the classic masters. After the Great Depression, Keynes amended Smith, behaviorists supplanted Freud, Marshall gave way to Oliver Holmes who eventually surrendered to the revisionist doctrines of Hugo Black and Earl Warren. The profession of arms, perhaps more than any other profession, is the most complex, changeable and unpredictable of all human endeavors. And history has shown, tragically, that failure to amend theories of conflict in time has had catastrophic consequences for the human race.

Western states are threatened by an amorphous, globally based insurgent movement. The inconvenience of Middle Eastern states collapsing and reforming in the midst of state-dependent terrorist environments makes this fourth generationalist assault on the master difficult to sustain, if not actually embarrassing.

Ossama Bin Laden's first desire is for his own caliphate or even emirate but at the end of the day, and in light of the bitter experiences of recent years, it's clear that none of these rudimentary attempts at revision possesses the intellectual heft or durability to challenge the tenets of the classic master of conflict theory

### **The Age of Amplifiers.**

Enter Alan Beyerchen, distinguished historian at Ohio State University. He has adopted a fundamentally different approach to capture the intellectual high ground in the battle to amend theories in light of modern war's realities. Beyerchen would embrace, rather than replace, the master. Beyerchen has developed a taxonomy of war in the modern era in terms of four world wars. Each war was shaped by what he calls "amplifying factors". Amplifiers are not multipliers or enablers in that their influence on the course of war is non-linear rather than linear. Amplifiers don't simply accelerate the trends of the past, they make war different.

For example, World War I was a chemists' war in that the decisive strategic advantage on the battlefield was driven in large measure by new applications of chemistry and chemical engineering. The war should have ended for the Germans in 1915 when their supplies of gunpowder nitrates exhausted. But the synthesis of nitrates by German scientist allowed the war to continue for another three horrific years.

World War II was a physicists' war. To paraphrase Churchill, the atom bomb ended the conflict but exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum in the form of the wireless and radar won it for the allies. "World War III" was the "information researchers" war, a war in which intelligence and knowledge of the enemy, and the ability to fully exploit that knowledge, allowed the United States to defeat the Soviet Union with relatively small loss of life.

Think of the shifts between world wars as tectonic rather than volcanic events. Their respective influence as amplifiers simply diminished over time.

In searching for this emerging amplifier, Beyerchen returns to Clausewitz's basic insight that war is influenced primarily by human beings rather than technology or bureaucracy. The human factor could never be a significant amplifier because its influence was relatively fixed and difficult to exploit. Humans have been considered constants more than variables. Yes, soldiers could be made better by conditioning, selection, psychological tuning and, since the last century, education. But it ultimately has come down to numbers, bigger battalions make a better army. Clausewitz did allow for the amplifier factor for genius in war – he fought repeatedly against Napoleon but he considered that human frailties made the identification and nurturing of genius problematic.

### **Winning "World War IV"**

Experience in Iraq and Afghanistan have convinced many in the military intellectual community of the value or psycho-cultural factors in war. But the idea that these factors are now decisive, that indeed they comprise the battle space, may be a tough sell. After all, American forces have won two World Wars through the efficient application of technology. And we have grown generations of generals who have been taught and have learned by their own experience that victories come from building better things. Our

fixation on technology, our very technological success, has led us to believe that the soldier is a system and the enemy is a target.

Building on Beyerchen, what I anticipate is that current conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere are telling us what's to come. In a nutshell, World War IV will cause a shift in classical centers of gravity from the will of governments and armies to the perceptions of populations. Victory will be defined more in terms of capturing the psycho-culture rather than a geographical high ground. Soldier conduct will be as important as skill at arms. Culture awareness and the ability to build ties of trust will offer protection to our troops more effectively than body armor.

Clausewitz tells us that the side that holds the initiative will ultimately prevail. The initiative will be owned by time. Americans have all the wrist watches but Afghans have all the time. We are in a race between the rogue states or non-states terrorists acquiring and using nuclear weapons versus our acquiring and deploying enough psycho-cultural armament to beat them on the ground. But even without nukes, the enemy has a natural advantage. He presents a paradox that plays to their strengths -- you must support us, he says, in spite of our intrinsic brutality, or support the outsider who may be more humane but is not part of our religion, culture, clan, tribe or ethnicity. And he can say -- I will always be here, will the Americans?

Only in the past few decades have the foundations of the social sciences advanced to the point that they might become the elements for victory. And until the military intellectual community acknowledges that all failures in Afghanistan and Iraq are human rather than technological, it is perhaps still an open question and the social sciences attract much interest as amplifiers. The author considers the most important objective for the first three World Wars was to make better machines, than surely the fourth World War corollary will be to make better soldiers, more effective humans.

The military of the future must be able to go to war with enough cultural knowledge to thrive in an alien environment. These soldiers must be identified and nurtured just as surely as the army selects those with operational court sense. We must also do this preemptively or prophylactically by building the suitable psycho-cultural infrastructures, both in the theater of war and at home.

**Perception shaping as art, not science:**

People in many regions of the world hate us. They have been led to these beliefs by an enemy whose perception shaping effort is as brilliant as it is diabolical. Our challenge is to create a human science intended specifically for shaping opinions, particularly among alien people. This task is too big for a single service or event for the defense department -  
- inculcate knowledge and teach wisdom.

We should take away from our combat experience a commitment to leverage human sciences, to make the tactical view of the enemy clearer and more certain, to differentiate between the innocent and enemy by reading actions to discern intentions. Scientific research suggests that social intelligence and diplomatic skills increase with age. We

know far more about pilot and astronaut behavior than about those who in the next World War will do most of the killing and dying -- the close-combat soldiers. If dead soldiers constitute our greatest weakness in war, we should as a matter of nation importance, devote resources to make them better. Most important to victory will be human influences such as selection, bonding and psychological and physical preparation of tactical units.

**Leadership and decision making:**

World War IV will demand intellectually ambidextrous leaders who are capable of facing the conventional enemy one moment, then shifting to an irregular threat the next moment. Gut feel and intuition replace hierarchical linear processes.

Military leaders have had “three” World Wars to establish comfortable relationships with chemists, physicists and information technologists. This was a marriage of necessity. Their relationship between the military and behavioral scientists to date has been of antipathy and neglect. There is an old saying -- the Navy and the Air Force man the equipment and the Army and Marine Corp. equip the man. Surely those services that focus on the man, and not the machine, should receive a huger share of defense budgets. We are in for decades for psycho-social warfare. We must begin now to harness the potential of the social science in the manner not dissimilar to the Manhattan Project or the Apollo project.

Understanding and empathy will be important weapons of war. As an example of the human element, juxtapose Wernher Von Braun (who aimed at the stars and bombed London) with Joseph Rotblat, who stated, “Forget everything else but remember your humanliness.”

The life histories of Wernher Von Braun and Joseph Rotblat offer us an opportunity to examine the differences and to highlight also that, while Europeans are interested in process, Americans want results.

Werner Von Braun, rocket developer and champion of space exploration from the 1930's to 1970's, commented about his NSDAP membership as follows:

I was officially demanded to join the National Socialist Party. At this time (1937) I was already technical director of the Army Rocket Center at Peenemund. My refusal to join the party would have meant that I would have to abandon the work of my life. Therefore, I decided to join. Membership in the party did not involve any political activities. In Spring 1940, one SS-Standartenfuhrer (SS Colonel) Muller...looked me up in my office at Peenemunde and told me that Reichsfuhrer – SS Heinrich Himmler had sent him with the order to urge me to join the SS. I called immediately on my military superior, Major-General W. Dornber. He informed me that..if I wanted to continue our mutual work, I had no alternative but to join.

That claim has been often disputed because in 1940, the Waffen-SS had shown no interest in Peenemunde yet. Also, the assertion that persons in von Braun's position were

pressured to join the Nazi party, let alone the SS, had been disputed. Braun claimed to have worn the SS uniform only once. He began as an Untersturmführer (Second Lieutenant) and was promoted three times by Himmler, the last time in June 1943 to SS-Sturmbannführer (Wehrmacht Major).

The V2 rocket, the brainchild of Von Braun's rocket team operating at the secret laboratory of Peenemunde, and was the immediate antecedent of the rockets used in space exploration in the United States and the Soviet Union. A liquid propelled missile, the V2 rocket flew at speeds in excess of 3500 miles per hour and delivered a 2200-pound warhead to a target 500 miles away. Before the Allied capture of the V2 rocket complex, Von Braun engineered the surrender of 500 of his top rocket scientists along with the plans and test vehicles for the Americans. Years after WW II, Von Braun worked with the U.S. Army in the development of ballistic missiles as part of a military operation named Project Paperclip. He and his rocket team were scooped up from defeated Germany and they were taken to America where they were installed at Fort Bliss, Texas. There they worked on rockets for the U.S. Army, launching them at White Sands Proving Ground, New Mexico. In 1950 Von Braun's team moved to the Redstone Arsenal near Huntsville, Alabama, where they built the Army's Jupiter ballistic missile.

Ironically, more people died building the V-2 rockets than were killed by it as a weapon.

To avoid the mistakes of Hitler's Germany, Cornwell argues that politics and ethics are questioned and exposed to criticize the military. A role model for such, good scientists exposed criticism and the trends of military dominated science.

As a comparative study for a good scientist is our Joseph Rotblat, the only scientist to leave the Manhattan Project on ethical grounds, who in a personal communication at one of the Pugwash conferences, said to me that for scientists, the most important issue should not be science but their humanliness. When he found out that Germany didn't have the bomb like Brecht's Galileo, Rotblat has called scientists to swear a Hippocratic oath, not to damage humanity. He added with a threatening finger, as he jokingly called to me "I'll be up there waiting for you."

John Cornwell timely and importantly went to study Hitler's scientists. He was motivated by the same heartfelt conviction as Rotblat. He poses an urgent question "How would scientists today deal with their scientific findings that involve weapons of mass destruction if Jewish scientists were forced out of their posts. When physicist Max Plank pleaded with Hitler not to expel such scientists, Hitler replied, "If science cannot do without Jews, then we will have to do without science." And in one of the great ironies of history, many of these same scientists proved vital to the construction of the atomic bomb in America.

In 1957, Rotblat founded the Pugwash Conference which served as a forum for researchers devoted to abolishing nuclear weapons and finding peaceful solutions to international conflicts. Rotblat became the first Secretary General of the organization

and under his more than forty years of leadership, Pugwash led the fight against nuclear weapons and was one of the foremost advocates of détente and disarmament.

Rotblat steadfastly challenged the various doctrines of nuclear deterrence. He personally invited me to attend the ceremony at Oslo, Norway in 1955 where he, along with the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, was presented the Nobel Prize.

Psychiatrists have the nasty habit of asking their patients to narrate their personal histories. I always tell them it is not important what they have told me or what I have told them, but the questions you ask yourself about yourself. In the case of Joseph Rotblat, he seemingly did not need to ask himself any questions. His humanliness could not make any deals or shortcuts. He remained truly professional. He was one of eleven signatories of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto asking scientists of every country to meet to devise ways of avoiding nuclear war. They made an urgent appeal to all governments to understand that humanity had entered a new era in which conflicts would have to be settled by peaceful means. "For there can be no winners in nuclear war," Russell and Einstein warned.