

Non-Proliferation crises: North Korea and Iran

Mark Fitzpatrick



Distinctions

- Nonproliferation: to stop WMD spread.
- Disarmament: to give up WMD.
- Arms control: to limit WMD.

WMD (weapons of mass destruction):

- Nuclear
- Chemical
- Biological
- Missile delivery systems

- Conventional weapons?

Nuclear-armed states

<u>State</u>	<u>Nuclear weapons*</u>
Russia	6,257
United States	5,500
China	350
France	290
United Kingdom	225
Pakistan	165
India	150
Israel	90
North Korea	40-50
Iran	0

Sources: Arms Control Association, SIPRI, US Dept of State. Estimates in most cases.

Non-proliferation tools

- Multilateral instruments: NPT, CWC, BWC, CTBT.
- Verification bodies: IAEA and OPCW.
- Export controls groups: NSG, Zangger Committee.
- Like-minded associations: e.g. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
- Financial controls, e.g. Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
- UN resolutions and sanctions.
- Unilateral and multilateral sanctions.
- Security treaties.
- Unilateral and multilateral deterrence

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Israel	1979?
Pakistan	1998
North Korea	2006

North Korea



Iran



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- “Rogue states
- Signed NPT
- Violated IAEA safeguards

Difference: Iran:

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Friday, 10 January, 2003, 06:06 GMT

N Korea withdraws from nuclear pact



Kim Jong-un, inspecting a
“hydrogen bomb,” Sept. 2017

North Korea nuclear site

Home to the country's first nuclear reactor, with a five megawatt capacity



Source : 38 North

How did North Korea get nukes?

- 179th poorest country in GDP per capita.
- Considered one of 30 most fragile states in world.
- Maintained program even during period of massive starvation in 1990s.




**“
We (Pakistan) will eat
grass, even go hungry,
but we will get one of
our own (Atom bomb)....
We have no other choice!**



North Korea obtained:

- Civil nuclear technology from USSR.
- Missile technology via black market from former USSR.
- Some parts from China, also from rest of world.
- Enrichment technology from AQ Khan.



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- Various unilateral & multilateral forms of pressure
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 - Missile defense



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- Incentives:
 - Bilateral and multilateral talks: 4-party, 6-party, 8-party.
 - Economic assistance.
- Strategic patience (Obama),
- Personal diplomacy (Trump).
- Back to strategic patience.

Some deals worked – for awhile

The 1994 Agreed Framework stopped plutonium production, rolled back capabilities and lasted 8 years.



Jimmy Carter and Kim Il Sung, June 1994

Some deals worked – for awhile



Kim Jung Un and Donald Trump, Singapore, June 12, 2018

After North Korea tested an ICBM in March 2022,
China and Russia blocked UNSC action.



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**US bombing destroyed 85%
of North Korea's buildings**

**US President Harry Truman and
General Douglas MacArthur**



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4. Assist in unifying the Korean Peninsula.

12 June 2018 Singapore Summit Joint Statement:

3. ...the DPRK commits to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

State-run KCNA news agency 20 Dec. 2018

“When we refer to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, it...means removing all elements of nuclear threats from the areas of **both the north and the south** of Korea and **also from surrounding areas** from where the Korean peninsula is targeted.”

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Lesser goals

- **Continued moratorium on testing, clearly defined;**
- **CTBT adherence;**
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- **Chemical weapons convention (CWC).**

But never stop demanding complete denuclearization.

The 2018 nuclear deal extended the Iran 's potential “break-out” period to one year. It is now a few days.



Parties to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)


**Iran has had a nuclear hedging strategy
ever since its 1980s war with Iraq.**



In 2003, Iran froze the nuclear weapons development work.

1. Designing nuclear weapons

Original Iranian illustration



In 2018, Israel stole Iran's nuclear plans.



Supreme Leader Khamenei's fatwa forbade any kind of WMD.

In a race between sanctions & centrifuges from 2005-2018, the latter were winning.



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and William E. Paterson



EUROPE AND IRAN'S NUCLEAR CRISIS

Lead Groups and EU
Foreign Policy-Making

Riccardo Alcaro



President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad inspects
Natanz centrifuges, March 2007

The 2015 JCPOA was work of the E3/EU+3 (aka P5+1)

E3 = Britain, France and Germany

EU = European Union

+3 = China, Russia and USA.

P5 = Permanent members of UN Security Council
(Britain China, France, Russia, UK, US)

+ 1 = Germany

Sanctions brought Iran to the table, but Obama's dropping a zero-enrichment demand led to the breakthrough.

JCPOA key points

- Enriched uranium stockpile cut by 98.
 - More than half of centrifuges taken offline.
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 - Much more verification than in normal safeguards.
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Choice between diplomacy and war?



In 2012, Israeli PM Netanyahu wanted to bomb Iran's enrichment plants.

**In May 2018, President Donald Trump
withdrew from the JCPOA.**



Secretaries of Defense James Mattis and of State Rex Tillerson advised keeping the deal.



National Security Advisor John Bolton persuaded Trump to kill it.

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- Denying IAEA access to JCPOA monitoring and surveillance equipment.

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President Rouhani was unable to close a deal before his term ended last June.



Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and then President Hassan Rouhani.

President Ebrahim Raisi missed a chance in early Sept. to conclude talks before hijab protests changed everything.



Most issues were resolved.

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The US:

- Reduced 1-year break-out time to 6-9 months.
- Stopped insisting Iran agree to talks on strengthening deal, missiles and regional activity.

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But Iran then insisted on a new condition:.

- **IAEA must stop investigating pre-2004 weapons development, and not probe any more.**

Iran hasn't explained man-made uranium traces the IAEA found at 3 sites.



IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

Is the JCPOA dead?



Yes

Is the JCPOA dead?



Yes



No

Is the JCPOA dead?



Yes



No



Shh

Plan B options

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3. Israel and US treat NPT departure as *casus belli*.

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1. More sanctions
2. Interception
3. Sabotage
4. Kinetic attack
5. Deterrence
6. Diplomacy

Iran may misjudge Israel's red line.



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5. We don't want adversaries to become more powerful.