

INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: UKRAINE


62nd ISODARCO Course 'Technology, War, and Nuclear Stability in an Age of Conflict'.

Dr. Polina Sinovets,
Odesa Center for Nonproliferation, ONU

February 24, 2022

Declaration of the "special military operation" against Ukraine:

"Whoever tries to hinder us or threaten our country should know that Russia's response will be immediate and will lead you to consequences that you have never faced in your history."



Main trends of global nuclear order 2022/2024

Growing role of nuclear weapons as a policy tool



Nuclear deterrence vs. threat of escalation

Threatening the future of nuclear disarmament

Arms control as a hostage of the global security environment ➡ arms race

The growing risk of nuclear escalation

Nuclear coercion 2 ways

Offensive deterrence

NW as an umbrella for the Russian aggression against Ukraine




Nuclear compellence

- Restraining the West from the weapons supplies to Ukraine/ deep-strike targeting
- Manipulating with nuclear escalation

Putin's main escalation speeches

- February 27, 2022
declared nuclear forces on high alert to coerce the West from active military support of Ukraine.
- The US – confirmed non-interference and denied Ukraine providing “no-fly zone.”



Putin's main escalation speeches

■ May 2022

Putin called the supply of the long-range weapons To Kyiv “intolerable”: threatened with escalation and striking on decision-making centres;

■ President Biden: the US won't give Ukraine missiles that can reach Russia




Putin's main escalation speeches

- September 21, 2022
on annexing
Ukrainian territories:
- *“if Russia feels its territorial integrity is threatened, we will use all defense methods at our disposal, and this is not a bluff.”*
- US sent private channels messaging on the consequences of Russia's NW use.



Putin's main escalation messages

- Address to the Federal Assembly February 2024:
- NATO risks nuclear war if sending troops to Ukraine



ND updates Nov. 2024:

Enemies

- Non-nuclear enemies supported by nuclear ones;
- States providing territory, airspace, and resources for aggression on RF

Situations:

- Massive attacks of drones/missiles;

Nuclear Deterrence Success or failure?

SUCCESS

- **Russia managed to deter the West** from direct interference in its war with Ukraine.
- **The West deterred Russia:**
 - a) Escalating at NATO territory;
 - b) Using TNW against Ukraine;

FAILURE

- **Russia hasn't deterred Ukraine who:**
 - Took back Kherson, Kharkiv.
 - Performed offensive operation at the legitimate Russian territory (Kursk oblast)
 - Destroyed about 20% of the Russian Black Sea fleet

Nuclear compellence success or failure?

FAILURE

Long-range missiles to Ukraine;

F-16 deal;

Higher involvement of Europe

SUCCESS

- Ukraine doesn't have all the arms it asked for.
- Delayed arms supplies to Ukraine in 6-12 months.
- The targeting issue (shifts in November 2024)

Threatening the future of nuclear disarmament

Growing belief in nuclear deterrence

Nuclear deterrence inspiration

September 2022 –
DPRK as nuclear
state; Arms/troops
supplies to Russia



- Iran – arms supplies to Russia, nuclear program development



Nuclear deterrence rejection

- Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

June 2022 – 1st
meeting of states
parties:

- Deterrence doesn't work/ bad/not reliable





From nuclear disarmament to deterrence support: Ukraine

- Disappointment on the failure of the Budapest Memorandum (1994);
- Demand for the security guarantees from the West (NATO membership)
- *“Either Ukraine will have nuclear weapons, and that will be our protection, or we should have some sort of alliance”*



NPT between deterrence and disarmament



Arms control as a hostage of Russia's war

Indirect coercive threats to the West

AC as a tool of compellence: the New START



2023 Putin's speech to the Federal Assembly:

- Suspension of the NEW START (2010):
- US position on Ukraine
- UK & France NWs;
- Promised to keep the NW numbers within the New START limits

AC as a tool of compellence: the CTBT

- November 2, 2023 - Russia withdrew from ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty “to stay in line with the US”.
- Promised not to conduct NW tests if the US won't start them.
- Background for further compellence?



The New START perspectives

- June 2023 – the US suggested Russia to come back to arms control “*without any conditions*” (J. Sullivan)

Russia (Ryabkov):

“ *our condition for returning to a fully operational treaty is for the U.S. to abandon its fundamentally hostile stance toward Russia* ”

Arms Control Future: Russia



"...the topic of arms control remains in the past since a return to a minimum level of trust is impossible today due to the double standards of the West".

(Gen. Gerasimov, December 2024)

- **Russia:** the question of Nuclear ASAT;
- Lavrov 2024: Russia will leave moratorium on the INF deployment.
- Rejected dialogue on risk reduction with the US;

Arms Control Future: the US

Trump administration 2:

- 1) Qualitative and quantitative leadership in NW;
- 2) Russia and China as main concerns;
- 3) New deployments in Europe and Asia



Arms Control Future

China



- The rapid increase of NW (expected to catch Russia and the US by 2035);
- Not a member of AC treaties;
- Might act on Taiwan concluding the results of the Ukraine war.

Europe



Arms race tendencies:

- Deployment of the US INF-range missiles in the EU states (US-Germany deal);
- Intent to develop a European missile (France, Germany, Italy, Poland) – GLCM, R-1000-1500 km

Conclusions

Russia's war on Ukraine has:



Increased the role of nuclear deterrence



Blurred perspective of nuclear disarmament



Ended up the regime of nuclear arms control, leading to the arms race