

RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE AND POLICY

Academician A. Arbatov

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Background. Early 1980's:

The third decade of intensive nuclear arms race between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Deployment of Soviet and U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe.

The SALT-2 of 1979 suspended due to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, instability in Poland, high tensions between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, between the U.S.S.R and China.



In June 1982, The U.S.S.R declares **a pledge of no-first-use of nuclear weapons**.

“It will be engraved with golden letters into the scripts of history”.

(Soviet minister of foreign affairs A. Gromyko)



Background. Early 1990's:

M. Gorbachev's "new political thinking" abroad and democratic reforms at home, INF Treaty (1987), Collapse of the Berlin Wall and Warsaw Pact, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (1989), CFE Treaty (1990), START-1 (1991). Failed military putsch in Moscow (August 1991), downfall of the Soviet Union (1991), resignation of M. Gorbachev, B. Yeltsin's rise to power, disintegration of the Soviet Army and Strategic Nuclear Forces, local conflicts in the U.S.S.R and Yugoslavia. Split between Yeltsin and Russian Supreme Soviet (1993), the Army supports Yeltsin and tanks open fire in Moscow.



Principal Guidance on the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, November 2, 1993, signed by President B. Yeltsin.

Two main changes in the military doctrine:

First, "*The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons against Russia and its allies...*"

Second, "*The right to use nuclear weapons in response to a large-scale conventional aggression **in critical situations** for Russia and its allies...*"



Background. the 1990's:

“Golden Age” of nuclear arms control (START-2, START-3 Framework), withdrawal of Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia with the help of the West, Budapest Memorandum to Ukraine, NPT indefinite extension (1995), CTBT (1996), war in Yugoslavia and NATO military intervention, Kosovo, wars across former Soviet space and Russia’s intervention, First tranche of NATO extension (1999).



The Russian military doctrine of 2000. April 21, 2000, Acting President V. Putin signed Decree No. 706 "On Adopting the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation".

“The threat of direct military aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies in its traditional forms has diminished”.

First, *“the Russian Federation keeps the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction against it or its allies”.* Russian goal: ***"inflicting preplanned level of damage on any aggressor, either a state or a coalition, under any conditions"***.

Second, *“the Russian Federation keeps the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a large-scale aggression with the use of conventional arms **in situations critical** for the national security of the Russian Federation”.*

Third, *“Russia will not use nuclear arms against the NPT member states not possessing nuclear weapons if there is no invasion or any other attack against the Russian Federation... carried out or supported by a non-nuclear weapon state jointly or due to alliance commitments with a nuclear weapon state”.*



Background the 2010's:

Russia's ratification of START-2 and CTBT (2000) and of ACFE Treaty, terrorist strike at the USA 9/11 (2001), NATO war in Afghanistan with Russia's full support, U.S. abrogation of the ABM Treaty and conclusion of SORT (2002), NATO war in Iraq (2003), Second tranche of NATO extension (2004), Russian war in Georgia and NATO summit in Bucharest (2008), conclusion of the New START (2010).



The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation approved by Russian Federation President D. Medvedev's edict on 5 February 2010

Threats:

- the desire to endow the force potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with global functions carried out in violation of the norms of international law and to move the military infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including by expanding the bloc;
- the deployment (buildup) of troop contingents of foreign states (groups of states) on the territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation;
- the creation and deployment of strategic missile defense systems undermining global stability and violating the established correlation of forces in the nuclear-missile sphere, and also the militarization of outer space and the deployment of strategic nonnuclear precision weapon systems.

First, “the Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies”.

Second, the Russian Federation “reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the use of conventional weapons **when the very existence of the state is under threat**”.



Background 2010-2020:

NATO intervention in Libya (2011), Putin's return to power (2012), destabilization of Ukraine and Russian incorporation of Crimea, war in Donbas (2014), Russian military involvement in Syria, JCPOA with Iran (2015), U.S. withdrawal from JCPOA, INF, Open Skies treaties (2018-2019)



Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence (June 8, 2020)

*“State policy on Nuclear Deterrence is defensive by nature, it is aimed at maintaining the nuclear forces potential at the level sufficient for nuclear deterrence... The Russian Federation considers nuclear weapons exclusively as a means of deterrence, **their use being an extreme and compelled measure**, and takes all necessary efforts to reduce nuclear threat”.*

*“The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons **when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy**”.*

“The conditions specifying the possibility of nuclear weapons use by the Russian Federation are as follows:

- a) reception of reliable data on a launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies;
- b) use of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction by an adversary against the Russian Federation and/or its allies;
- c) attack by adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions;
- d) aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons **when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy**”.



Background: the 2020-2025's:

The New START extension by 5 years and consultations on strategic stability (2021), Russia's initiation of a Special Military Operation in Ukraine (2022-2026), broad Western sanctions against Russia and military support of Ukraine, Russian air/missile strikes against Ukraine and Ukrainian drone strikes deep into Russian territory, growing mass media pressure in Russia for the use of nuclear arms against Ukraine and its "sponsors", Trump returns to power and initiates intensive diplomacy on peaceful settlement, Israeli/U.S. war against Iran (2025).



FUNDAMENTALS of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence (November 19, 2024)

The state policy on nuclear deterrence is defensive in nature, aimed at maintaining the capabilities of nuclear forces at a level sufficient to ensure nuclear deterrence... of a potential adversary from aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies, and – in the event of an outbreak of a military conflict – the prevention of the escalation in hostilities and their cessation on terms acceptable to the Russian Federation and (or) its allies.

“The Russian Federation considers nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence, the employment of which is an extreme and compelled measure...”

*The Russian Federation reserves the right to employ nuclear weapons in response to the employment of nuclear and (or) other types of weapons of mass destruction against itself and (or) its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) the Republic of Belarus as participants in the Union State with the employment of conventional weapons, **which creates a critical threat to their sovereignty and (or) territorial integrity**”.*



FUNDAMENTALS of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence (November 19, 2024)


The conditions for nuclear weapons employment:

- a) receipt of reliable data on the launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territories of the Russian Federation and (or) its allies;
- b) employment of nuclear or other types of weapons of mass destruction by an adversary against the territories of the Russian Federation and (or) its allies, against facilities and (or) military formations of the Russian Federation located outside its territory;
- c) actions by an adversary affecting elements of critically important state or military infrastructure of the Russian Federation, the disablement of which would disrupt response actions by nuclear forces;
- d) aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) the Republic of Belarus as participants in the Union State with the employment of conventional weapons, which creates a critical threat to their sovereignty and (or) territorial integrity;**
- e) receipt of reliable data on the massive launch (take-off) of air and space attack means (strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned, hypersonic and other aerial vehicles) and their crossing of the state border of the Russian Federation.**

LAUNCH-ON-WARNING (LOW) OPTIONS IN NUCLEAR STRATEGY OF RUSSIA (2024)

receipt of reliable data on the launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territories of the Russian Federation and (or) its allies

receipt of reliable data on the massive launch (take-off) of air and space attack means (strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned, hypersonic and other aerial vehicles) and their crossing of the state border of the Russian Federation

A high-angle, fisheye photograph looking down into a large, circular concrete missile silo. A white, cylindrical missile is mounted on a launch rail in the center of the frame. The silo's interior walls are made of light-colored concrete with visible joints and some dark, possibly painted, sections. The perspective creates a strong sense of depth and scale.

LAUNCH-ON-WARNING OPTION IN US NUCLEAR STRATEGY (2018)

the United States will maintain a portion of its nuclear forces on alert day-to-day, and retain the option of launching those forces promptly

the capability to launch ICBMs promptly means that no adversary can be confident in its ability to destroy them prior to launch. This option contributes to deterrence of a nuclear first strike attack